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AFTER SNOWDEN: REGULATING TECHNOLOGY-AIDED
SURVEILLANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
DAViD D. COLE*
Imagine a state that compels its citizens to inform it at all times of
where they are, who they are with, what they are doing, who they are
talking to, how they spend their time and money, and even what they are
interested in. None of us would want to live there. Human rights groups
would condemn the state for denying the most basic elements of human
dignity and freedom. Student groups would call for boycotts to show
solidarity. We would pity the offending state's citizens for their inability
to enjoy the rights and privileges we know to be essential to a liberal
democracy.
The reality, of course, is that this is our state-with one minor wrinkle.
The United States does not directly compel us to share all of the above
intimate information with it. Instead, it relies on private sector companies
to collect it all, and then it takes it from them at will.' We "consent" to
share all of this private information with the companies that connect us to
the intensely hyperlinked world in which we now live through our smart
phones, tablets, and personal computers.' Our cell phones constantly
apprise the phone company of where we are, as well as with whom we are
talking or texting.3 When we send emails, we share the addressing
information, subject line, and content with the internet service provider.4
When we search the web or read something online, we reveal our interests
Copyright © 2016, David D. Cole.
* Hon. George J. Mitchell Professor in Law and Public Policy, Georgetown Law. I
delivered a version of this essay at the John E. Sullivan Lecture at Capital University Law
School in 2014. Parts of this essay are also developed and adapted from David Cole, Is
Privacy Obsolete?, NATION (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/privacy-20-
surveillance-digital-age, and David Cole, Must Counterterrorism Cancel Democracy?, N.Y.
RFV. BOOKS (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/01/08/must-
counterterrorism-cancel-democracy.
1 See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
2 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
3 See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations
Worldwide, Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-
worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-1 I e3-bc56-
c6ca94801 fac story.html.
4 See, e.g., What Data Does Google Collect?, GOOGLE, https://privacy.google.com/data-
we-collect.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
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to the company that runs the search engine.5 When we purchase anything
with a credit card, we pass on that information to the credit card company. 6
In short, we share virtually everything about our lives--much of it
intensely personal-with some private company. It is recorded in an easily
collected, stored, and analyzed digital form. We do so "consensually," at
least in theory, because we could choose to live without using the forms of
communication that dominate modem existence. But to do so would
require cutting oneself off from most of the world as well. That is a high
price for privacy.
We do not affirmatively consent to share this information with the
government. But a rule announced back in the analog age by the Supreme
Court of the United States holds that what we share with third parties is no
longer private, at least when the government obtains information from the
third party.7 Thus, if the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) wants to
find out who we have been calling and where we have been, it can
approach the phone company and demand our phone data and location
records. If it wants to know what websites we have been visiting, it can
demand those records from our internet service provider. If it wants to
know what we have been thinking about, it can obtain our search history
from Google. Under the Court's third-party disclosure rule, we have no
privacy interest in any of this information. As a constitutional matter, the
government can obtain it without any basis for suspecting us of
wrongdoing and without a judicial warrant.8
The third party disclosure rule is just one way in which privacy
protections are threatened in the digital age. The border search exception9
5 d.
6 See Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit Card Company Know About You?, N.Y.
TIMEs MAG. (May 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/O5/17/magazine/17credit-
t.html.
' See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
This Court held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.
Id. 8 See id. As discussed below, some courts have questioned the applicability of the
third-party disclosure rule in the digital era, in particular to cell phone location data. See
infra note 10; United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc
granted, 624 Fed. App'x 75 (4th Cir. 2015).
'See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
(continued)
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has long held that the government may search an individual and her
possessions when she is crossing the border, without a warrant, probable
cause, or any individualized suspicion.10 But most of us routinely carry
some form of personal computer-a laptop, tablet, or smart phone-with
us when we travel, including internationally. And, as the Court observed
in Riley v. California," those computers generally contain more personal
information than could be gleaned from an exhaustive search of one's
home.' 2 They record with precision and unerring accuracy who you have
been communicating with, what you have been reading, what information
you have searched for, and where you have been.13 Should the state be
permitted to search computers for such information, without any basis for
suspicion, simply because one is crossing a border?
If the U.S. government had its way, every arrestee who happened to be
carrying a cellphone would also have surrendered all the information on
his phone to the police. The government maintained that the search
incident to lawful arrest exception-which provides that the police may,
without any further suspicion or warrant, search the person of an arrestee
and any containers in his immediate control-authorizes police to search
arrestees' cell phones and smart phones.14  The Court, however,
unanimously rejected that proposition, holding that because of the quantity
That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of
the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and
property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of
the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no
extended demonstration.
Id.
.o See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616; but see United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957
(9th Cir. 2013) (declining to apply the extended border search exception to forensic search
of laptop computer).
11 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
12 See id. at 2491.
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far
more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only
contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the
home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found
in a home in any form--unless the phone is.
Id.
13 See id. at 2490 (observing that "it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more
than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of
nearly every aspect of their lives").14 See id. at 2491.
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and personal character of the information contained in cellphones, the
police must obtain a warrant to search a cellphone of an arrestee. 15
As Jennifer Daskal has powerfully shown, computer data can travel
across borders without our awareness, is often difficult to associate with
particular individuals while en route, and can be stored virtually anywhere
in the world.16 These features have the potential to compromise privacy
protections for such data in significant ways. 17 If the Fourth Amendment is
deemed not to protect against searches directed at foreign nationals living
abroad-as a broad reading of the Court's decision in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez"8 might suggest-then many of our communications
are, as a practical matter, vulnerable to searches without constitutional
limitation of any kind.'9 In that case, the Court declined to extend the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement to U.S. officials' search of a
Mexican national's home in Mexico.2" Relying on that precedent, the U.S.
government maintains that as long as the National Security Agency (NSA)
targets a foreign national living abroad, it need not satisfy Fourth
Amendment standards, even if it "incidentally" collects communications
with U.S. citizens and residents by doing so.21
As a result of the digital revolution, the face of privacy has changed,
and will continue to change, dramatically. We are in danger of losing
much of the privacy we once had, which has immense consequences not
only for our personal lives but also for the character of our country. The
aim of this essay is to describe the danger, respond to some of the most
common arguments that we need not worry about the problem, and point to
signs that all three branches of the federal government have begun to
recognize that the digital age poses new challenges that require new rules
to ensure the protection of privacy.
The significance of digital technology developments to both
surveillance and privacy cannot be overstated. Before the advent of
computerized records and the internet, much of the information now
routinely collected was either unavailable or available only at prohibitive
15 See id. at 2485.
16 Jennifer Daskal, The Un-territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 329 (2015).
17 Id.
18 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
19 See id. at 274-75; id. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing the Court "h[eld]
that although foreign nationals must abide by our laws even when in their own countries,
our Government need not abide by the Fourth Amendment when it investigates them for
violations of our laws").20 Id. at 263.
21 Brief for the Petitioners at 7, Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)
(No. 11-1025).
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cost. For example, if the government wanted to know where you were
every moment of the day, it could in theory assign an investigator to tail
you around the clock. 22 But that is both expensive and exceedingly
difficult to accomplish without detection. Moreover, even such round-the-
clock surveillance could not see what you were doing inside buildings and
behind walls. Now, we all carry with us at virtually all times a cell phone
or smart phone, devices that routinely track our location, record many of
our communications and thoughts, and transmit that information to phone
companies and internet service providers.
23
In the past, if the government wanted to know what you were reading
or thinking about, it had limited options. It could search your home to see
what was there, but that required probable cause and a warrant, 24 and even
then it would only stumble across those materials that you kept on hand.
There would be no real way of knowing what you were thinking about,
short of asking you directly. If there were any likelihood that an answer
might be incriminating, you could assert the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. 25 Now the government can, without
probable cause or a warrant, obtain your web browsing history from
Google, which likely knows more about what you have been thinking than
you yourself might be aware. I can forget what I was researching three
days, much less three months, ago; Google, in contrast, never forgets.
In addition to perfect recall, computers also have the capacity to store
and analyze massive amounts of information about any one of us, or-as
NSA contractor Edward Snowden's 2013 disclosures revealed-about all
of us. Among other things, Snowden's leak informed Americans that, for
more than seven years, the NSA had been collecting phone "metadata"-
the phone numbers we call and the time and duration of our
conversations-on virtually all of us.26  It did so under the ostensible
22 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct 945, 961 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
23 According to Pew Research, as of 2013, 91% of Americans owned some kind of cell
phone. Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% of Adults, PEw RES. CTR. (June 6,
2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hits-91-of-
adults. And in 2015, nearly two-thirds of Americans owned smart phones. Aaron Smith,
U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEw RES. CTR. (April 1, 2015), http://www.pewintemet.org/
2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015.
24 See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978) ("The critical element
in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized
are located on the property to which entry is sought.").
25 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself ... ").
26 See Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Mass Phone Surveillance Revealed by
Edward Snowden Ruled Illegal, GUARDIAN (May 7, 2015, 11:39 AM),
(continued)
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authority of a provision of the USA PATRIOT Act that authorized the FBI
to obtain only those business records "relevant" to a specific terrorist
investigation. 7  But the NSA argued-and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISA Court or FISC) agreed in secret, one-sided
proceedings-that it should be able to collect everyone's records without
any connection to terrorism, on the theory that anyone's records might at
some future point become relevant to a terrorist investigation.28 On that
expansive theory of relevance, it is not clear what information would not
be subject to bulk collection by our security agencies.
The NSA's international surveillance is even more intrusive. Snowden
revealed that the NSA, often acting in concert with Britain's General
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), has intercepted and collected not
just metadata, but the actual contents of all manner of electronic
communications from millions of foreign nationals, including texts, phone
calls, emails, contact lists, and internet browsing. 9 Under section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of
2008, the NSA can collect the contents of electronic communications of
any person it believes is a foreign national living abroad, as long as it does
so for foreign intelligence purposes.30 It need not have individualized
suspicion that the target is engaged in any terrorism, espionage, or
wrongdoing of any kind.3 Under another authority, Executive Order
12,333, the NSA collects foreign communications data without any
statutory or constitutional limit whatsoever.32 Until recently, the NSA was
constrained in how aggressively it could monitor the world by its limited
resources and capabilities. Today, however, it has the capacity to collect,
store, and analyze massive quantities of information-and it seems to have
had the attitude that if it can collect and analyze information, it should do
so. Modem technology affords the government newfound ways to monitor
all of us. And as long as it does so with information gathered from third
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/07/nsa-phone-records-program-illegal-
court.
27 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 215, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
28 See American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015)
(rejecting government's expansive interpretation of section 215, and finding the NSA
metadata program unauthorized by statute).
29 Nick Hopkins, UK Gathering Secret Intelligence via Covert NSA Operation,
GUARDtAN (June 7, 2013, 9:27 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/
jun/07/uk-gathering-secret-intelligence-nsa-prism.
30 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
31 See id.
32 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
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parties, at borders, or from foreign nationals living abroad, the government
contends that the Constitution imposes no limits on its ability to do so.33
These advances in technological capacity also increase exponentially
the government's ability to construct intimate portraits of any particular
individual's life by collecting all sorts of disparate data about the
individual, and then combining and analyzing the data for revealing
patterns. A single phone call, credit card transaction, or location might not
tell very much about someone's private life. But, for example, if the phone
call was to an abortion provider, the location showed that the individual
shortly thereafter visited the provider, and the credit card showed a
sizeable fee paid, one could easily infer that an unwanted pregnancy had
been terminated.
Defenders of the new surveillance make several arguments for why we
need not be concerned. None of them pass muster. With respect to the
domestic NSA phone metadata program, they insist that the government
collects only metadata about the calls and not their content. But the
collection of metadata alone can have major consequences. Metadata
could reveal, for example, whether one is calling a rape crisis, suicide, or
drug treatment hotline; or a mistress, bookie, or specific political
organization or party. As Stewart Baker, former general counsel of the
NSA, has said, "Metadata absolutely tells you everything about
somebody's life.... If you have enough metadata, you don't really need
content."34 When I quoted Baker's remark at a public debate with General
Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA, Hayden concurred readily,
and raised him one. Hayden boasted, "We kill people based on
metadata."35
In some ways, metadata is more threatening to privacy than content
because it is more easily analyzed by computer. To derive useful
information from the content of phone calls, a human being has to take the
time to listen to them. (This may become less true as voice recognition
technology improves.) But computer algorithms can be used to draw
critical conclusions from metadata about individuals' private lives without
having to listen to the content of their conversations. Accordingly, the
33 See PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
119 (July 2, 2014), https://www.pclob.govilibrary/702-Report.pdf.
34 See Alan Rusbridger, The Snowden Leaks and the Public, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (Nov.
21, 2013) (quoting Stewart Baker), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/11/21/snowden-
leaks-and-public.
11 See David Cole, 'We Kill People Based on Metadata', N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10,
2014, 10:12 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/05/1O/we-kill-people-based-
metadata.
20161
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government is able to engage in dragnet surveillance3 6 with metadata at a
much lower cost than if it had to review content.
Some NSA defenders suggest that as long as there are enough back-
end limits on how the information can be used, we ought not to be
concerned about government collecting and storing the information in the
first place. Thus, the government has stressed that the NSA's phone
database could only be accessed by a limited number of NSA analysts,
only for counterterrorism purposes, and only if they had reasonable
suspicion that a particular phone number was associated with a terrorist
organization or individual.37
Back-end use limitations are an important element of the
reasonableness of searches and seizures and an important tool in protecting
privacy. Particularly in an age when the private sector already collects vast
quantities of data about our private lives,38 it is essential that we pay more
attention to how that information is used. Europeans, for example, insist
on strict limits on how private companies use the private data they collect,
and they restrict how information, once it has been collected, can be used,
sold, or transferred to others.39 Until now, with a few exceptions, Fourth
Amendment doctrine has focused on the act of collection and has had
relatively little to say about how that information is actually maintained,
collated, and used by the state. Thus, to search a home, the police must
generally have probable cause and a warrant.4" But once they seize items
from the house pursuant to the warrant, they do not need additional
authorization to consider it in combination with other information they
may have, or to comb through the seized materials again.
There are exceptions. Under the administrative search doctrine, for
example, the constitutionality of drug testing of students engaged in
extracurricular activities turns in part on the limited use to which the
36 "Dragnet" is defined as "a system in which the [authorities] look for criminals using
systematic and thorough methods." Dragnet, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
37 See OFF. OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON REVIEW OF SIGNALS
INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17
/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence [hereinafter SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE].
38 See Marie O'Reilly, As Private Sector Embraces Big Data, Public Sector Falls
Behind, IPI GLOBAL OBSERVATORY (May 8, 2013), http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/05/
as-private-sector-embraces-big-data-public-sector-falls-behind. When millions of
customers around the world purchase goods at Walmart, the retailer collects data about their
consumer behavior. ld "The privatc scctor has embraced big data analytics." Id.
39 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC); Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data
Prot. Comm'r (Oct. 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf,
jsessionid--9ea7dOfl 30d5bbf805dca432456ea788e756c7ad?text-&docid=169195&pagelnd
ex=0&doclang=en&mode lst&dir=&occ=first&part = I &cid=94600.
0 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1970).
[44:677
TECHNOLOGY-AIDED SURVEILLANCE
students' urine is put in the testing process.41 Similarly, in concluding that
the taking of DNA samples from arrestees is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court stressed that the DNA was used for identification
purposes only, and not to gather any of the other information that can be
gleaned from genetic material.42 These decisions suggest that at least
where private information is collected from individuals on a showing of
less than probable cause, the reasonableness of the program under the
Fourth Amendment may well turn on the limits imposed on how the
government uses and analyzes the information.
In most instances, however, back-end use limitations are not sufficient
to satisfy Fourth Amendment concerns, because the invasion of privacy is
said to occur at the time of the initial search or seizure. Collection of data
itself has privacy costs, irrespective of how the information is subsequently
used. No court would accept the NSA collecting 24/7 videotape footage
from every American's bedroom, no matter what back-end limits were
imposed on access to and use of the information.
Moreover, once a database exists, what is to stop mission creep? If a
database can be searched for terrorists today, why not for serial murderers
and rapists tomorrow? And if data may be searched for rape and murder,
why not assaults, robberies, and illegal drug transactions? Thus, although
use limitations are important, they should not be treated as sufficient to
satisfy Fourth Amendment standards where the government obtains private
information that has the potential to reveal intimate details about
individuals.
Some commentators suggest that privacy is dead in the digital age, and
we should simply get used to it.43 They point to young people's social
media practices as evidence that privacy is no longer a serious value, given
how readily individuals share the most intimate details of their lives on
relatively open-access websites and platforms. 4 But that greatly overstates
the case. In significant part to safeguard their privacy, most people-
including most young people-still lock the doors to their houses, close the
doors to their bedrooms, and password-protect their computers and phones.
There remains a difference for most people between what they will share
with an intimate friend, family member, doctor, or therapist, and what they
41 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825, 834 (2002).
42 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
41 Scott McNealy, former CEO of Sun Microsystems said, "You have zero privacy
anyway .... Get over it." Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: 'Get Over It', WIRED (Jan. 26,
1999), http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1 999/01/17538.
44 See Theodore F. Claypoole, Privacy and Social Media, A.B.A. Bus. L. TODAY,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/01/03a claypoole.html (last visited Feb.
25, 2016).
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will post on a social media platform. Although some have chosen to bare
many details of their lives, others choose to retain their privacy.45
Finally, it is commonly said that if you have nothing to hide, you have
nothing to fear. But that argument misunderstands the importance of
privacy. Privacy is valuable not only to criminals, but to all of us. Most of
us insist on and value the privacy of the home, even if we never intend to
engage in any criminal activity there. The sense that one is being watched
inflicts a chilling effect on a wide range of wholly lawful activity.
Intimacy and political freedom demand privacy, even for those who have
done nothing wrong.4 A society without privacy would make it easier for
the police to capture criminals and terrorists. We have nonetheless
recognized that the democratic and individual values of privacy justify its
protection, even though criminals will also be able to exploit it. Indeed, it
is in significant part because privacy is valuable for the law-abiding that
we protect it for law-breaking.
The law has always had to adapt to new technologies to preserve
privacy. We can, and I believe, will, adjust the rules to preserve privacy-
but only if the technologies of surveillance are not hidden in the shadows.
Somewhat paradoxically, transparency is critical to effective privacy
reform. Before Snowden's disclosure of the NSA domestic metadata
program, for example, all three branches had approved it. President
Obama maintained the program, which he inherited from his predecessor,
George W. Bush. Congress reauthorized section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act47 seven times, even after the executive branch informed it
of the NSA phone metadata program-albeit in limited classified briefings
that hampered members' abilities to understand fully what was going on.48
And the FISC repeatedly authorized the program, without even writing an
opinion setting forth its reasoning.49 Indeed, when the program was
4' Facebook is currently the largest social media website. Agnieszka A. McPeak, The
Facebook Digital Footprint: Paving Fair and Consistent Pathways to Civil Discovery of
Social Media Data, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 893-94 (2013). It allows users to select
their own privacy settings and who they want to see certain things. Id. This allows users to
control the information they share with the outside world. Id.
I See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 199 (1890) (stating that privacy has value and every individual has the right to decide
what he or she will and will not disclose to the public).
41 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 215, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
48 David Cole, Reining in the NSA, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (June 2, 2015, 3:40 PM),
http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/06/02/nsa-surveillance-congress-sunset.
41 See David Cole, Can Privacy Be Saved?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (March 6, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/03/06/can-privacy-be-saved.
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disclosed, government officials often defended the program by asserting
that all three branches of the government had blessed it.50
Yet all of that changed once Snowden disclosed the program.
President Obama appointed an expert review panel and subsequently
endorsed several of its suggested reforms. 5 He agreed, for example, that
the NSA should be required to obtain judicial approval before searching its
telephone database, that those searches should be more limited in scope,
and that a public advocate should participate in hearings before the FISC.52
Another executive branch body, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board, launched an investigation and determined that the domestic
telephone metadata program was illegal because, contrary to the FISC's
conclusions, it was not authorized by section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act.5
3
The courts, which had repeatedly authorized the NSA's domestic
phone metadata program while it was secret, also changed their approach
once it became public. A federal district court in Washington, D.C.,
declared that the program was likely unconstitutional. 54 The U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the program was illegal
from its outset, as section 215 does not encompass collecting every
American's phone data in bulk 55  Even the FISC itself, which had
routinely rubber-stamped the official collection of metadata while it was
secret, changed its ways. Whereas it had approved the program on
multiple occasions without even writing an opinion, after the program was
disclosed, it wrote an opinion providing its rationale.56 And while the
50 J. Kirk Wiebe, Who Broke the Law, Snowden or the NSA?, CNN (Dec. 18, 2013,
12:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/17/opinion/wiebe-snowden-amnesty. See also
David Cole, Must Counterterrorism Cancel Democracy?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 8, 2015),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/01/08/must-counterterrorism-cancel-democracy.
51 Mike Levine, White House Picks Panel to Review NSA Programs, ABC NEWS (Aug.
21, 2013, 9:50 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/m/blogEntry?id=20030899&ref=-http%3A%2F
%2Ft.co%2FBZwibdjVsL. See also THE PRESIDENT'S REV. GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COMM. TECHS., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 24-42 (2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12 rgfinal report pdf.
52 SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE, supra note 37.
53 PRIVACY AND C.L. OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM
CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 10 (2014), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/
pclob-215.pdf.
54 See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 41 (D.D.C. 2013).
11 See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 812.
56 In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things
From [Redacted], 2013 WL 5741573, at *9.
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FISC had previously kept virtually all its opinions secret, it has, since
Snowden, released many to the public.57
Congress, which had repeatedly reauthorized the USA PATRIOT Act
provision that the NSA relied on to conduct its domestic phone data
program, also changed course once the program became public.58 In June
2015, it enacted the USA FREEDOM Act, 59 which, among other changes,
ended the NSA's bulk collection of metadata, allowed privacy advocates to
participate in FISC hearings, required public disclosure of that court's
opinions, and imposed new disclosure requirements on the NSA.'
More broadly, both Congress and the courts have recognized that the
law needs to adapt to advances in technology. Congress has amended the
FISA on several occasions to reflect changes in technology.61 The
Supreme Court of the United States altered Fourth Amendment doctrine to
address the advent of telephone wiretapping in Katz v. United States;62
required the police to obtain a warrant before using a thermal imaging
device to detect heat emanating from a home in Kyllo v. United States;63
held in United States v. Jones that the Fourth Amendment is implicated by
the use of a global positioning system (GPS) device to track a car's
movements in public for a month;64 and, in Riley v. California,6 ' required a
warrant to search the cellphone of an arrestee. In all of these cases, the
Court rejected government arguments that the rules should not change in
light of new technologies and that the government should be able to exploit
" See, e.g., In re Application of F.B.I., Misc. No. 15-01, 2015 WL 5637562 (FISA Ct.
June 29, 2015); In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-96, 2014 WL 5463290 (FISA Ct.
June 19, 2014); In re Application of F.B.I., No. BR 14-01, 2014 WL 5463097 (FISA Ct.
Mar. 20, 2014).
" Steven Nelson, Senate Passes Freedom Act, Ending Patriot Act Provision Lapse,
U.S. NEWS (June 2, 2015, 6:34 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/06/02/
senate-passes-freedom-act-ending-patriot-act-provision-lapse. See also USA FREEDOM
Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (enacted to "reform the authorities of
the Federal Government to require the production of certain business records, conduct
electronic surveillance, use pen registers and trap and trace devices, and use other forms of
information gathering for foreign intelligence, counterterrorism, and criminal purposes, and
for other purposes").
'9 129 Stat at 268.
6 See generally id.
61 See David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 7-8
(Brookings Inst., Geo. U. L. Ctr. & Hoover Inst., Working Paper, 2007),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2007/11/1/5%20nationalsecurity/ 2
Okris/l 115_nationalsecuritykris.
62 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
63 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
64 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
65 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
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those technologies without Fourth Amendment constraints.66 In each case,
the Court adjusted Fourth Amendment doctrine to ensure the continuing
protection of privacy.
67
Although the Court has not yet addressed whether the "third-party
disclosure" rule needs updating in the digital era, Justice Sotomayor has
already stated that she thinks it might need to be,68 and the opinions in
Jones and Riley suggest that the Court recognizes that we are indeed in a
brave new world. In 2015, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit rejected application of the third-party disclosure rule to the
collection of historic cell phone location data.69 In Graham, the panel held
that "the government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment
when it obtains and inspects a cell phone user's historical [cell-site location
information] for an extended period of time," and that the government
must obtain a warrant for such data.7" The court relied on the reasoning of
Justice Alito in the GPS monitoring case, concluding that the collection of
data revealing an individual's location over an extended period of time
intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.7' The Fourth Circuit
has granted rehearing en banc, and a decision is pending. Other courts
have found that the third party disclosure rule should apply to location
data, although often over dissents.72 Thus, the Court is almost certain to
take up the issue in the near future. If privacy is to be preserved, some
modification of the third party disclosure rule is necessary, perhaps guided
by the approach Justice Alito took in his concurrence in Jones, which
recognizes that when technology enables the government to monitor
citizens in ways that disclose information that they previously had a
reasonable expectation would remain private, the Fourth Amendment
should treat that investigative method as a search.73
- Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491; Jones, 132 S. Ct at 951-52; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37; Katz,
389 U.S. at 352.
67 Riley, 134 S. Ct at 2495; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Katz, 389
U.S. at 359.68 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
69 United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2015), reh "g en banc granted,
624 Fed. App'x 75 (4th Cir. 2015).7 0 Id. at 344-45.
71 Id. at 347.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 507-09 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(holding, over dissents, that cell phone location data is covered by the third party rule);
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887-89 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that cell phone
location data is covered by the third party rule).
73 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
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We need not await for the Court's protection, however. Congress and
the state legislatures can also enact rules that protect privacy from the
threats that new technology poses. Justice Alito has urged Congress to
take up the issue.74 In the past, Congress responded to the Court's
decisions denying constitutional protection to certain types of information
by enacting new statutory privacy protections.75 Thus, although the Court
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to place no limit on the government's
ability to obtain records from one's bank or credit card company, Congress
has enacted law restricting access to that information.76 Although there are
risks to leaving privacy protection to the legislative process-in particular
the likelihood that law enforcement interests will trump privacy concerns
in the drafting process-legislation is nonetheless a possible avenue for
protection, particularly where, as in the NSA domestic phone metadata
program, the interest in protecting privacy is widely shared.77
The states can and should play a part as well. Many of the new
surveillance technologies are available and used at the state and federal
level .7 The vast majority of criminal law enforcement is carried out by the
states.79 State legislatures and state courts are therefore appropriate venues
for confronting the issue of how to preserve privacy in the digital age.
State protections cannot fall below the floor established by the federal
Constitution, but the states are free to provide greater protection-and
many do.80
Finally, Americans ought to confront the threats to privacy posed by
the private sector. We certainly have more to fear from the state than from
Google; only the state can launch a criminal investigation or prosecution,
and governments have an unfortunate, but demonstrable, tendency to target
dissenters.81 But it is also possible and advisable to impose privacy limits
on what the private sector can do with the information it gathers from and
74 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962-63 (Alito, J., concurring).
75 See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2012).
76 See id.
77 On the risks of relying on Congress, see David Alan Sklansky, Two More Ways Not
to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 223, 232-33 (2015)
(detailing how the Justice Department succeeded in watering down legislative restrictions
on access to pen register data after Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
78 David Cole, Is Privacy Obsolete?, NATION (Mar. 23, 2015),
http://www.thenation.com/article/privacy-20-surveillance-digital-age.
71 See Jerold Israel, Yale Kamisar, Wayne LaFave, Nancy King & Eve Primus,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES
AND INTRODUCTORY TEXT 2 (2015 ed.) (noting that state systems account for 99% of the
criminal docket in the United States).
80 See Cole, supra note 78.
8' See FED. R. CRIm. P. 18.
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about us. As noted above, European law restricts not only what the
government can do with private data but also what the private sector can
do.82 If the government has started outsourcing much of its surveillance to
private companies, we would do well to limit what those companies can do
with our data in the first place.
Privacy has never been more vulnerable than it is today. The digital
era has brought us unimagined conveniences, but it has simultaneously
created previously unthinkable risks. Some have pointed to these
developments to argue that privacy is dead. But that's a premature
diagnosis. Like Mark Twain's death, reports of privacy's demise are, for
the moment, greatly exaggerated. But, privacy may be on life support.
Unless we insist on new rules to govern and regulate the use of new
technologies of surveillance, not only our privacy will be lost but all that
depends on privacy as well, including democracy itself.
82 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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